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A follow-up study of the end results for 132 oil, gas and chemical plants with risk analyses carried out over 
36 years demonstrates that risks were found to have been reduced significantly. Most of the major 
accidents have occurred due to management failure to implement recommended safeguards. This 
particular problem was solved over the period of the study. However 20% of the accidents were found to 
have been due to unpredictable accident scenarios, which is a very serious observation. If this pattern is 
maintained over a wider range of industrial areas, it means that the promise of risk analysis as a tool for 
safety improvement is much diminished. It also means that risk analysis is of limited value in making policy 
decisions about the safety of new technologies. Initial studies indicate that the problem indeed is 
significant in many areas such as aerospace, automotive, medical and pharmaceutical, energy production 
industries, and in power and communications infrastructures. Research is ongoing now at DTU to identify 
and classify the causes of unforeseen accidents and to do a mapping between them and solutions 
(organisational and computational) to improving the predictability of accidents. 
In this research, among unforeseen accidents we distinguish unpredictable and predictable accidents. 
Unpredictable accidents can only be described in retrospect and after that become predictable and 
preventable if proper lessons have been learned and proper barriers implemented. Predictable accidents 
occur and become unpreventable because of deficiencies in the risk management process, negligence of 
the responsible personnel, misjudgement of losses and benefits, or simply because of accidents’ 
assessment as not incurring large losses compared to expenses for their prevention. We distinguish four 
groups of causes for not being prepared for accidents: (1) organisational and human, (2) inadequate models 
(including expert judgements) providing assessments of accident probabilities (frequencies) or severity of 
accidents, (2) accidents which are in principle predictable, but for which current methods are impractical 
and (4) accidents for which there is currently insufficient knowledge to allow predictability.  
A substantial volume of unforeseen accidents have been collected and a number of reasons have been 
identified which can lead to inability to predict accidents. To exemplify some, the following reasons are 
listed: 
• The knowledge needed for prediction simply does not exist; 
• The knowledge needed for prediction is reported, but not available to the analysts responsible for 
safety analysis, nor to the engineers responsible for design; 
• Errors and oversights due to inadequacies in the hazard identification process; 
• Deficiency in the scope of the analysis. 
In the presentation we will demonstrate all the causes of inability to predict accidents we have identified 
and our suggestions for improvements in risk management practices to avoid preventable accidents. The 
current limits of accident prediction, and as far as possible, finding ways of eliminating these limits will be 
discussed as well.  
